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Evil Banalized 
Eichmann sʼ Master Performance in Jerusalem
Since the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1963, the unintended 
consequences of Hannah Arendtʼs depiction of Eichmann have been to 
reduce the moral consequence of evil actions.1 Whether she meant only that 
the evil of this man, Eichmann, was banal, as Jaspers considered, her concept 
has been taken to mean that evil generally speaking is a banal phenomenon.2 
It is evident to me that humankind has become inured to the mass genocides 
that characterize this age: to the horrors of Nanjing, Hiroshima, Auschwitz, 
Rwanda, Somalia, and Dafur. The immediate purpose of this article is to 
examine Hannah Arendtʼs analysis of Adolf Eichmann in order to point 
out the groundlessness of her argument that evil, whether in the person of 
Eichmann himself, or in general, can be treated as banal. The wider purpose 
of this article is to divest any argument that is based on the concept that evil 
is banal, ordinary, or trivial of any valid grounding. 
Regardless of authorial intent, if Arendtʼs text itself, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, contains the direct statements and/or implications that Eichmann sʼ 
evil actions were banal, or the work of an ordinary man, then ex hypothesi, to 
arise from a normal base, his evil actions and by extension, all evil actions, 
are ipso facto normalized and trivialized. If evil behavior is perceived as 
the benchmark of what is normal and therefore to be expected, it follows 
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1
 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New 
York, Penguin, 1994); henceforth EJ. It has been pointed out to me that a similar point 
of view to mine has been expressed by Elhanan Yakira in his book, Post Holocaust 
Post Zionism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). While this book was 
not available to me at the time of writing this article, I have seen it since. It does not 
appear to me to be making the same argument.
2
 Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 1926–1969, ed. Lotte Kohler and 
Hans Saner, trans. Robert & Rita Kimber (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1992), p. 542.
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that whenever evil occurs, particularly mass slaughter, shoulders will be 
shrugged and little will be done. Why should any action be taken to stop 
mass slaughter when it is considered banal or trivial?
The Holocaust serves as an example of unmitigated evil. Since, 
empirically, it has been so well documented – perhaps, because it was the 
work of Western Europeans, the German nation, considered as the most 
“civilized of cultures” – it stands out as a horror that cannot find any excuse 
in ignorance. The Holocaust is a call to remembrance of all horrors man has 
done to man. Eichmann is the icon of the perpetrator just as Anne Frank is 
the icon of the victim. Eichmann, more than Hitler, for while one can always 
find counterparts of evil rulers throughout history, of Caligulas and Neros, 
it is difficult to find an example of a more willing and obedient bureaucratic 
murderer than Eichmann.
Analyzing the Language of Evil
As a philosopher, I want to lodge a severe protest against Hannah Arendtʼs 
use of language for language has a power to influence us no matter what the 
language userʼs actual intentions might or might not be. I want to extirpate 
the meaning of ʻbanal  ʼ from the vocabulary of evil. For ʻbanal  ʼ implies 
not only ordinariness, but a certain connotation of that which is beneath 
notice, that which is so ordinary as to be not worthy of our attention. If 
this connotation of the word ʻbanal  ʼ is communicated, then the net effect 
of calling Adolf Eichmannʼs evil ʻbanal  ʼis egregious, for instead of calling 
attention to evil, it numbs us to its presence. It renders evil, in effect, not 
worthy of our attention.
Consider the dictionary definition of the word ʻbanalʼ. According to 
Websterʼs Unabridged 2nd Edition, “to banalize = To render or make banal; 
trivialize: Television has often been accused of banalizing even the most 
serious subjects.” While dictionary definitions are of course not legislative, 
they do reflect historical usage. Hannah Arendtʼs use of the term ʻbanal  ʼin 
connection with the evil of Adolf Eichmann does in the mind of the English 
language-user trivialize the evil that it modifies. And, this is precisely what 
we should not do. Evil, as a serious subject, should never be trivialized.
The language that one uses is a reflection of our thoughts. Thus, the 
exploration of the use of the term ʻbanal  ʼ in connection with evil is not 
only an exercise in language analysis. It is designed to stimulate us to 
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think more deeply about the meaning of evil. Hannah Arendtʼs use of the 
term ʻbanal  ʼin connection with evil is, to use her description of Eichmann, 
ʻthoughtlessʼ.
This is the charge. That Hannah Arendt should never have used the word 
ʻbanal  ʼ in connection with evil. To be properly scholarly, we should now 
examine how she came to use such a word. Perhaps, an examination of why 
she chose such a word will be of assistance in helping us to realize that the 
reasons for such a choice were not well founded and that that is all the more 
reason why such a choice should be avoided.
Hannah Arendt sʼ Choice of a Book Title
The first question we can raise is, What exactly did Hannah Arendt find to 
be banal? Was it the magnitude of the crimes Eichmann committed? Was 
it the nature of the crimes? Was it the personal character of Eichmann? Of 
course, what comes to mind is that what she obviously must have meant 
was not the magnitude or the nature of the crimes, but the character of the 
perpetrator. But, if this is what she meant, why in the subtitle of her book, is 
this not specified? In the subtitle of her book, which has had more influence 
than anything else she may have said in the body of her work, the phrase is 
not qualified. The phrase reads, ʻThe Banality of Evilʼ. It is not Eichmannʼs 
character that is described as ordinary or trivial: it is the very nature of evil 
itself. This subtitle is seriously misleading and we cannot fault anyone who 
takes her meaning to be that evil itself, the very evil that Eichmann perpetrated 
(for the main title does refer to Eichmann) was trivial. At the very least, such 
a subtitle is thoughtless. And thoughtlessness in a philosopher is equivalent 
to a lack of digital dexterity in a surgeon. 
One can, of course, attempt to rescue Hannah Arendt and argue that the 
subtitle modifies the entire title, ʻEichmann in Jerusalemʼ, and intends that 
the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem was a testament to the banality of evil, but 
this only places the onus for evil being banal or trivial on the proceedings. It 
still leaves the reader with the connotation that evil is trivial, but the cause for 
the triviality is the fact that Eichmann was tried at all, was tried in Jerusalem, 
or was tried in the manner in which the prosecution conducted the trial. If 
this is Hannah Arendtʼs meaning, and there are suggestions in the book that 
this is not entirely wrong, it might carry an even more sinister connotation, 
to wit, that to prosecute evil is to trivialize it.
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What other connotation can one draw from this fantastic title? One could 
imagine that it is Eichmannʼs character or personality that is on trial (instead 
of his deeds). Then, ʻEichmann in Jerusalem  ʼrefers to the presence of this 
person named Eichmann in Jerusalem (on trial). ʻThe banality of evil  ʼ is 
a phrase that modifies Eichmann: either Eichmann as a person personifies 
the banality of evil, or Eichmann as a person personifies the banality of the 
evil-doer. It is not the evil that Eichmann has committed that is trivial, but 
it is that evil has been perpetrated by such a trivial person. This is indeed 
how Hannah Arendt has argued that this is what she meant. But, such an 
interpretation stretches the meaning of the words in the title beyond credulity. 
For if this is what she meant, she should have entitled the work, ʻEichmann 
in Jerusalem: The Banality of the Criminal  ʼor ʻEichmann in Jerusalem: The 
Banality of the Evil-Doerʼ. For ʻ banal  ʼin the subtitle still modifies ʻ evilʼ, not 
ʻEichmannʼ. Hannah Arendt does not mean what she says and she does not 
say what she means.
Even if one grants that Arendtʼs choice of a title referred only to the 
personality of Eichmann as being banal, it would carry untoward consequences. 
First of all, it is difficult for the ordinary reader, or repeater of the title of her 
book (for repeaters of titles of books far outnumber actual readers of books), 
to make the subtle distinction between Eichmannʼs personality and his 
deeds. The force of the subtitle, which has become the most infamous phrase 
of Arendtʼs and possibly the second most infamous phrase of a philosopher, 
ʻthe banality of evilʼ, has become a power of influence all of its own. (The 
most infamous phrase, ʻG-d is deadʼ, was actually coined by Martin Luther, 
but has been attributed to Nietzsche).
Second, it is difficult, in the end, to separate character from action. If 
oneʼs character is truly ordinary, then by definition, oneʼs behavior is truly 
ordinary. Character, Heracleitus once wrote, is destiny. If one is a perfectly 
ordinary person, then oneʼs intentions, oneʼs moral nature, are acceptable. 
Thus, even if the intention is to capture only the personality of the perpetrator, 
it is not completely clear that this character depiction does not extend to the 
deeds carried out by the perpetrator. For Aristotle and Confucius, character 
is intimately linked to moral or immoral actions. For Aristotle, moral actions 
are the means to building oneʼs moral character. Immoral actions would 
build an immoral character. 
In Aristotleʼs account of morality in the Nicomachean Ethics, what one 
ultimately attempts to achieve in life is a moral character. Every noble action, 
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for Aristotle, builds oneʼs moral character. One can say, with equal justice, 
that every ignoble action builds an immoral character. In this sense, one 
cannot separate character from behavior. Oneʼs behavior would be a result 
of oneʼs character and oneʼs character would be a result of oneʼs behavior. 
Thus, even if it is only Eichmann the man who is perceived of as ordinary, 
as normal, as banal, then, for Aristotle, this banality, this ordinariness, is also 
the result of the deeds that he had committed. If evil deeds contribute to the 
make-up of an ordinary, normal, and banal character, then it becomes difficult 
to conceive of the deeds as extraordinary, abnormal, and outrageous.
If one thinks seriously about the matter, if oneʼs personality is ordinary 
and beneath notice, it is an easy transition to the concept that the deeds of 
such a person will be ordinary and therefore beneath notice. The more one 
emphasizes the ordinariness of the evil-doer, the more difficult it becomes 
to feel stirred to outrage at the deeds of the evil-doer. The brushstroke of the 
painting of the label of ordinariness is broad. It covers evil-doer and evil-
done alike in one stroke. 
There are two questions which I would like to raise. The first is, How did 
Hannah Arendt obtain the impression of the banality of Adolf Eichmann in 
the first place? The second is, What are the consequences of considering 
evil as trivial? While Hannah Arendtʼs supporters will argue that she did 
not mean that evil was trivial, it is my contention that either part of her did 
consider that evil was trivial or that her communication, regardless of her 
intention, did carry the meaning that evil was trivial. I think that evidence 
can be cited for both of these conclusions, but it is not important for my 
purposes to prove that part of Hannah Arendt did believe that evil was trivial. 
It is very important to show that Hannah Arendt communicated that evil was 
trivial. She also communicated that the horror of the crimes committed by 
Eichmann was reprehensible and horrible. But she communicated both of 
these points irrespective of her intention. In effect, Hannah Arendt sent out 
a double message. And, in my opinion, the message that evil is ordinary or 
trivial has obliterated her message that certain crimes are so extraordinary 
that they are crimes against humanity as such.
Adolf Eichmann sʼ Performance in Jerusalem
Since the first question raised above influenced the second, we should 
attempt to answer it first. Hannah Arendt would never have argued that the 
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evil-doer, Adolf Eichmann, was banal unless she were convinced that he was 
banal. So our first question is, What led Hannah Arendt to think that Adolf 
Eichmann was a banal or trivial person in the first place? 
This is a question that is raised with acute skill by Jules Steinberg.3 
Steinberg argues, citing evidence from the text, Eichmann in Jerusalem, that 
Hannah Arendt did not see Adolf Eichmann in his terrifying Nazi uniform 
visiting camps where Jews were shot, but saw a harmless man sitting, 
dressed in a suit, inside a glass cage. Hannah Arendt mistook the man in the 
glass cage for the Nazi murderer. The man in the glass cage was a harmless 
man in a suit. But he had been a Nazi murderer of millions of people. That 
he appeared unprepossessing now did not mean that he was a harmless 
dolt then.
I would like to take note of Steinbergʼs brilliant analysis. It is not only 
that Arendt is misled by Eichmannʼs appearance. It is that Eichmann fooled 
Hannah Arendt. For the reasons Eichmann gave for his actions, we only 
have the testimony of Adolf Eichmann. Hannah Arendt accepts Eichmannʼs 
testimony on his own behalf at face value. She does not question the veracity 
of his statements. If Eichmann claims that he was not aware that what he was 
doing was wrong, she accepts this prima facie. It is as if Hannah Arendt is 
accepting the evidence of the fox that the chickens were always safe under 
his watchful eye. If Eichmann was a murderer, had it not occurred to her 
that he could be a liar? Even if it is the case that her intention is not to 
convey the impression that mass murder is trivial, but only that this infamous 
mass murderer is a trivial man, this entire belief, that he is a trivial man, is 
almost certainly the invention of an extremely clever Adolf Eichmann. Her 
representation of the personification of the banality of evil is itself based 
upon an outrageous falsehood. Adolf Eichmann, the master killer, duped 
millions of people into thinking that he was sending them to labor camps. It 
was a banal accomplishment on his part that he fooled Hannah Arendt into 
thinking that he was a harmless bureaucrat.4
3
 Jules Steinberg, Hannah Arendt on the Holocaust: A Study of the Suppression of 
Truth (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000).
4
 According to newly declassified tapes, recorded in the 1950s while Eichmann was 
hiding in Argentina and now in the German Federal Archive in Koblenz, Eichmann 
boasted that he “was no ordinary recipient of orders” and that he “was part of the 
thinking process; an idealist.” “I didnʼt just take orders,” Eichmann is heard saying. 
“If I had been that kind of person, I would have been a fool.” The tapes demonstrate 
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This is not unlike the often cited remark that Heideggerʼs association with 
Nazism was forgivable because he was “politically idiotic.” This thinker, 
whom some rank as the foremost philosopher of the twentieth century, 
accepted Nazism because of sloppy thinking. Eichmann, too, accepted his 
role, in his case as a mass murderer, because he was ʻthoughtlessʼ. It is 
difficult to discern which exoneration is more ludicrous.
Hannah Arendt apparently thinks that she is simply reporting what she 
observed. Her subtitle reflects this as it reads: “A Report on the Banality 
of Evil.” She says in a letter to her friend Mary McCarthy that “My ʻbasic 
notion  ʼof the ordinariness of Eichmann is much less a notion than a faithful 
description of a phenomenon. . . . the most general [conclusion] I drew is 
indicated: ʻbanality of evilʼ.”5 
What we can do is to examine some passages in Eichmann in Jerusalem 
which show that Eichmann was not as unthinking as Arendt thought that 
he was. Arendt herself supplies the evidence for Eichmannʼs extraordinary 
thinking powers. It is only puzzling why she does not draw the conclusion 
that he is diabolically clever from the evidence that she presents. 
Jules Steinberg quotes from Jean Améry (Hans Maier), from a chapter 
entitled “Torture” in Améryʼs book, At the Mind sʼ Limits: Contemplation 
by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities: “For there is no ʻbanality of 
evilʼ, and Hannah Arendt, who wrote about it in her Eichmann book, knew 
the enemy of mankind only from hearsay, saw him only through the glass 
cage. When an event places the most extreme demands on us, one ought not 
to speak of banality.”6 The ʻus  ʼto which Améry refers must refer to Adolf 
that Eichmannʼs defense of himself as simply following orders was a ruse. Indeed, 
his guilt is magnified when one considers his disappointment that when looking 
back upon his role in organizing the systematic slaughter of Jews, gypsies, and other 
groups, he says, “We didnʼt do our work correctly. We could have done more.” See, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,7554486,00.html While I was 
unaware of these tapes at the time of the writing of this article, Eichmann sʼ recorded 
remarks do add further evidence to my thesis that his self-defense at his trial was a 
master performance.
5
 Between Friends: The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy, 
1949–1975, ed. Carol Brightman (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), p. 152.
6
 Jules Steinberg, Hannah Arendt on the Holocaust, pp. 34–35; Jean Améry, At 
the Mind sʼ Limits: Contemplation by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 25.
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Eichmann. The demand to murder millions of people is the event which 
places the most extreme demands on someone. In this context, one cannot 
speak of oneʼs reaction to this as trivial or banal. Oneʼs reaction to this, 
even if masked as an ordinary reaction, cannot be taken to be an ordinary 
reaction. If one reacts in an ordinary way to such an extraordinary demand, 
an ordinary reaction becomes monstrous. 
Steinberg goes on to point out that Eichmannʼs portrayal of himself as 
an ordinary bureaucrat seeking only his personal advancement is a disguise 
because earlier in her own work, Arendt herself supplies a different motivation 
for his actions: “earlier in the book [Eichmann in Jerusalem], Arendt had 
provided Eichmann with another, very different motive, for participating in 
this enormous crime of murdering all the Jews: ʻWhat stuck in the mind 
of these men who had become murderers was simply the notion of being 
involved in something historic, grandiose, unique (ʻa great task that occurs 
once in two thousand yearsʼ).”7
If Eichmann had such a motivation, how could she classify him as ordinary? 
Are these ordinary aspirations? According to Steinbergʼs analysis of Améry, 
“Arendt is duped by Adolph Eichmann, who pretended to be small, sniveling, 
timid, fearful, in Arendtʼs words, thoroughly banal.”8 For Eichmann gave a 
master performance in court. Could this be the same Eichmann who murdered 
millions of people? Why would Hannah Arendt take this depiction as an 
accurate representation of the real Eichmann? According to Seyla Benhabib, 
the evidence that Arendt was persuaded by was: “Eichmann spoke in endless 
clichés, gave little evidence of being motivated by a fanatical hatred of the 
Jews, and was most proud of being a ʻlaw-abiding citizenʼ.”9
The Duping of Other Commentators
What seems amazing is that other commentators also accept Arendtʼs 
interpretation of Eichmann as Mr. Ordinary. For example, Dana R. Villa 
writes, “It was Eichmannʼs ʻ extraordinary shallownessʼ, his one distinguishing 
characteristic, which led Arendt to name an evil that required neither 
7
 Steinberg, p. 39 and EJ, p. 105.
8
 Ibid., p. 220, emphasis in original.
9
 Seyla Benhabib, “Arendtʼs Eichmann in Jerusalem,” in Dana Villa (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), p. 67.
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exceptional wickedness nor depravity, but only a profound lack of thought 
and judgment.”10 But, why accept Arendtʼs understanding of Eichmann as 
shallow and without thought? This is, certainly, how Eichmann meant for the 
Court to understand him so as to exempt him from responsibility. Eichmann 
wanted to be taken as a faceless and mindless bureaucrat who was carrying 
out legal orders. This is how Eichmann wanted to be perceived. But, why 
did she then take this opera buffa at face value? Can anyone believe that 
someone who knew that he was sending millions of people to die was doing 
so merely out of a desire to achieve personal advancement? Arendt, and 
seemingly Villa after Arendt, take Eichmannʼs pose to be reality. This entire 
idea of ʻthe banality of evil  ʼ is, according to Villa and to Arendt herself, 
Arendtʼs central idea. And what if it is entirely a pretense on the part of 
a criminal hoping to escape indictment? In this case Arendtʼs central idea 
is based upon a deceitful fabrication. The so-called banality of evil never 
existed in the first place.
Villa seems to take Eichmannʼs self-portrayal as veridical. For Villa, the 
Eichmann book is about “the fate of conscience as a moral faculty in the 
midst of a generalized ʻmoral collapse  ʼ such as the one brought about by 
the Nazi regime. Eichmannʼs case demonstrated how conscience, in such a 
context, is perverted: it no longer tells individuals what is right and what is 
wrong. But, neither is it totally silenced, for it continues to tell people like 
Eichmann what their ʻduty  ʼis.”11
This was, of course, Eichmannʼs self-defense. But, what is utterly 
amazing is that Arendt and Villa after her seem to swallow it whole: 
“Eichmann, according to Arendt, did not need to ʻclose his ears to the voice 
of conscienceʼ, as the judgment has it, not because he had none, but because 
his conscience spoke with a ʻ respectable voiceʼ, with the voice of respectable 
society around him.”12
Not only is this disingenuous, for conscience must oppose seemingly 
respectable society when respectable society voices views which are morally 
abhorrent, but it is astonishing that Arendt and Villa are persuaded by such 
10
 Dana R. Villa, Politics, Philosophy and Terror: Essays on the Thought of Hannah 
Arendt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 40–41.
11
 Ibid., p. 45.
12
 Ibid., pp. 48–49; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: 
Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1973), p. 455.
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a diabolical twist of the meaning of the concept of conscience. What we 
are beginning to notice is that Eichmannʼs thinking powers, far from being 
insipid and weak, are incredibly powerful. Eichmannʼs thinking powers 
are so powerful that they can seduce the minds of intelligentsia such as 
Arendt and Villa. In a stroke worthy of a Hegel, he is capable of turning 
the meaning of the concept of conscience into its opposite. Such dialectical 
cleverness is only matched by the credulousness and simple-mindedness of 
his commentators. They even think that someone whose mind is capable of 
performing such feats of skill is weak-minded and thoughtless.
There is more to come. Eichmann actually justifies his thinking by 
reference to Kant, whose ideas on morality, with which he shows not only a 
passing familiarity but a studied familiarity, he has adapted to his own moral 
conduct. How many “banal and ordinary men” not only quote Kant in their 
own defense, but show how their actions correspond to his moral theory? 
The notion of Eichmann as being a “banal bureaucrat” begins to sound very 
much like Antonyʼs characterization of Brutus as an “honorable man.” The 
only difference is that it is Antony who speaks ironically, while Arendt and 
Villa appear to actually believe in spite of their own evidence that Eichmann 
is a simple-minded dolt. 
It is only necessary to quote from Villaʼs account of Arendt:
As Arendt relates, Eichmann surprised everyone at the trial by coming up with a 
relatively correct formulation of Kantʼs Categorical Imperative: “I meant by my 
remark about Kant that the principle of my will must always be such that it can 
become the principle of general laws.” [This shows the banality of his weak thinking 
powers!] He added that he had read Kantʼs Critique of Practical Reason [the everyday 
manʼs average reading matter – apparently he had not bothered with the relatively 
simpler Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals]. (Ibid., p. 50; EJ, pp. 135–36)
Despite evidence of his scholarship and abstract thinking ability, she, and 
apparently Villa, conclude that “she draws our attention to the morally most 
puzzling aspect of the case, the fact that Eichmann ʻhad no motives at allʼ, 
that he merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was 
doing” (p. 51; EJ, p. 287).
This is only morally puzzling if one takes as a fact (rather than Eichmannʼs 
artful pretense) that he had no motives at all. Could a simple-minded man 
even come up with such a self-portrayal? Or, does this not sound more like 
an artful criminal, portraying himself as merely carrying out the orders of 
those in authority above him?
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Arendt objects to Eichmannʼs interpretation of Kant (she thus engages in 
a scholarly duel with this “average man”). She objects that he has distorted 
it to read: “Act as if the principle of your actions were the same as that of 
the legislator or of the law of the land.”13 Eichmannʼs appropriation of Kant 
is ingenious. Her objection might be valid. But what the exchange proves 
beyond the shadow of a doubt is that she considers his thinking a worthy 
opponent for her to combat. His appropriation is original and clever beyond 
words. She feels that it is so powerful that it is necessary to prove it to be 
wrong. Who is right in this debate is not settled by this short exchange. 
But, it is an exchange between Kantian scholars. And, one of these Kantian 
scholars is “thoughtless and banal Eichmann.”
There is no need to belabor the obvious. Eichmann was possessed of a very 
subtle and learned mind. He was by no means a representative of the “man 
on the street.” This awareness, that he was a subtle slaughterer, certainly 
makes more sense out of his criminality than the thought that he was a dull 
bureaucratic pencil pusher. But, consider Arendtʼs reduction of this Kantian 
scholar back to the average man: “The trouble with Eichmann was precisely 
that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted or 
sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal . . . this 
new type of criminal . . . commits his crimes under circumstances that make 
it well-nigh impossible for him to know or feel that he is doing wrong.”14
Arendt and perhaps Villa after her have swallowed Eichmannʼs pretense 
hook, line, and sinker. Not only that, but such a swallowing can now make 
way for further criminals to justify their actions by appealing to the moral 
denseness of their times and their inability therefore to know right from 
wrong. It is odd that some individuals, suffering from the same social 
pressure, were capable of telling right from wrong under these conditions. 
What are we to make of all this? In the case of Villa, perhaps he is persuaded 
by Arendtʼs arguments. What of Seyla Benhabib? She hypothesizes that 
“The phrase the ʻbanality of evil  ʼwas meant to refer to a specific quality of 
mind and character of the doer himself, but neither to the deeds nor to the 
principle behind those deeds.”15 Benhabib appears also to accept Arendtʼs 
13
 Ibid., p. 50; Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence (note 2 above), p. 166.
14
 Ibid., p. 53; Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954, ed. Jerome 
Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1994), p. 276, emphasis added.
15
 Benhabib, “Arendtʼs Eichmann in Jerusalem” (note 9 above), p. 74, emphasis in 
original.
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uncritical acceptance of Eichmannʼs self-portrayal as an unthinking actor. 
She quotes Arendt approvingly:
It was precisely this lack of imagination which enabled him to sit for months on end 
facing a German Jew who was conducting the police interrogation . . . It was sheer 
thoughtlessness – something by no means identical with stupidity – that predisposed 
him to become one of the greatest criminals of that period. (Ibid., p. 75)
But, this is a judgment. This is Benhabibʼs interpretation. What enabled him 
to sit through such a trial might well have been strong discipline rather than 
a lack of imagination. Would someone with a lack of imagination come up 
with such an incredible appropriation of Kant? Would someone who was 
thoughtless been capable of reading Kant in the first place? Eichmann did not 
bother with Kantʼs simple works such as his essay “What is Enlightenment?” 
or the Groundwork, but took on Kantʼs work of middle difficulty. And, take 
note of the strange qualification of thoughtlessness to make it unequal to 
stupidity. There is an awareness that Eichmann is not stupid. Somehow, one 
can be smart and yet thoughtless. It seems that Arendt and her followers are 
even better than Eichmann at coming up with artful defenses of his dreadful 
criminality. In the end, he is referred to as “one of the greatest criminals of 
that period.” This achievement, out of thoughtlessness, absent-mindedness, 
blundering?
Julia Kristeva, in her book, Hannah Arendt, also assumes that Arendt is 
correct in her assessment of Eichmann as the ʻJoe averageʼ. It seems that, 
after Eichmannʼs duping of Arendt, what results is a domino effect in which 
each further commentator is duped by the previous commentatorʼs duping. 
Kristeva writes, “Eichmann (in my opinion) presents a persona of being 
a mild bureaucrat with no opinions of his own.” Arendt assumes that this 
outward presentation is not artifice, but is the genuine Eichmann. And others, 
writing of Eichmann or Arendt, follow in turn, like philosophical dominos. 
Consider these statements of Kristeva: 
Among the targets of the attacks against Arendt, her main thesis on the “banality of 
evil,” as embodied by Eichmann, was no doubt the most difficult to dispose of [I infer 
from this that Kristeva finds Arendtʼs account of Eichmann valid and well based]. 
The political theorist makes herself into a narrator here and recounts the biography 
of an ordinary German, “neither feeble-minded nor indoctrinated nor cynical.” This 
“average,” “normal” person upset her during the entire trial because he proved 
himself “perfectly incapable of telling right from wrong.”16
16
 Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, trans. Ross Guberman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001), p. 147; EJ, p. 26.
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Evidence from Arendt sʼ Text that Eichmann was Thoughtful 
What is Arendtʼs evidence for Eichmann being incapable of telling right 
from wrong? It is Eichmann himself, his self-testimony that convinces her. 
Someone who putatively cannot tell right from wrong is capable of telling 
truth from falsehood and thus capable of telling the truth. Apparently, 
an incapacity to tell right from wrong is no obstacle to telling truth from 
falsehood. Someone who cannot tell right from wrong is considered a 
credible witness of himself. Is it not more likely that the person who cannot 
tell right from wrong also cannot tell truth from falsehood? Or, is it not more 
plausible that the person can tell right from wrong and can also tell truth 
from falsehood and is simply lying? Why would one bend over backwards 
to accept someoneʼs self-testimony that implies that they cannot tell right 
from wrong? Is it not rather prima facie suspect that someone is lying when 
they allege that they cannot discern that what they are doing is wrong? Is it 
not uncritical to accept that they are offering truthful testimony when the 
testimony that they are presenting clearly has the motive of self exoneration? 
Would all of this not be more plausible to account for on the hypothesis of 
skillful pretense?
Eichmannʼs statements are not always inane. Consider, for example, 
the statement he made at the end of the war: “I will jump into my grave 
laughing, because the fact that I have the death of five million Jews on 
my conscience gives me enormous satisfaction” (EJ, p. 46). Is the ability 
to conjure up this image of jumping into his own grave and the fantastic 
juxtaposition of satisfaction with having death on his conscience the wit and 
statements of a man with feeble imagination? Is ʻto jump into my grave 
laughing  ʼ a trite image? He also told the court in Jerusalem that “I shall 
gladly hang myself in public as a warning example for all anti-Semites on 
this earth” (EJ, p. 53). Again, is this ability to conjure up a public hanging to 
make an impression for all ʻon this earthʼ, the conjuring of a man with little 
or no imagination? Again, in Arendtʼs reading of Eichmann, the vision of 
himself “laughing” had given Eichmann “ ʻan extraordinary sense of elation 
to think that [he] was exiting from the stage in this way  ʼ ” (ibid.). To be 
fair, this is Arendtʼs attribution, but in this case since it is her attribution, he 
must not have appeared banal since she describes him as thinking of himself 
as making a stage exit. And she describes his interior mirth as well. Do 
ordinary bureaucrats imagine themselves as exiting from a stage? Are dull, 
insipid minds capable of extraordinary senses of elation? One is reminded 
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of the startled reaction – “Wally, a poet?” – of one of Wallace Stevens  ʼco-
workers at the bank at which he worked when this co-worker attended the 
famous poetʼs funeral. Wallace Stevens did work at a bank, but he was not 
an ordinary teller. Einstein also worked at a patent office.
There are other proofs of Eichmannʼs extraordinariness. Eichmann did 
not only have the capacity for grandeur or the grand gesture. He was also 
the master of the concise statement, another feature of the well-honed mind. 
Consider his infamous statement, “A hundred dead people is a catastrophe; 
six million dead is a statistic.”17 Is this the statement of a man with no 
imagination; a dull bureaucrat? A man incapable of thinking? A man capable 
of speaking only in clichés? Is this not the statement of a man with a mind so 
crisp as to be capable of reducing unimaginable horror and an unimaginable 
figure to a commonplace, mathematical notion? To be able to reduce 
unmitigated horror to a commonplace notion, a statistic, thus wrenching the 
horribleness out of it with one swift motion of thought, does this not take an 
astonishing and diabolical skill? To be able to take mass murder and reduce 
it to something else altogether, to a mathematical description, to be able to 
take bloodthirsty horror, moral evil beyond imagination, and to change it to 
the pure and abstract clarity of mathematics, why, this is absolute genius. 
How could anyone, save a swift thinker, a thinker possessing the skills of 
dialectical reduction, have come up with such an epigram worthy of Oscar 
Wilde? (Though Wildeʼs mind did not take such cruel turns.) This is a thinker 
with a rapier wit, par excellence.
And, it does not stop there. For Eichmannʼs selective incapacitation is used 
by Arendt, according to Kristeva, to conclude further that the vast majority 
of the Nazis were also of the same ilk. They were not moral monsters. They 
were simply thoughtless, absent minded bumbles, as they meticulously 
17
 This remark is attributed to Eichmann by Simon Wiesenthal. Eleanor Ayer and 
Stephen Chicione write, “In order to demonstrate Eichmannʼs knowledge of and 
participation in Hitlerʼs ʻFinal Solutionʼ, Wiesenthal told of a report from a Nazi 
meeting in Budapest, Hungary, in 1944. Some of Eichmannʼs cohorts asked how 
many Jews had been exterminated so far. When Eichmann responded, ʻ5 millionʼ, 
they asked him if he were nervous about what might happen to him when Germans 
lost the war. Reported Wiesenthal, Eichmann gave a very astute answer that shows 
he knew how the world worked. ʻA hundred dead people is a catastropheʼ, he said. 
ʻSix million dead is a statisticʼ.” See Eleanor Ayer and Stephen Chicione, Holocaust: 
From the Ashes: 1945 and After (Woodbridge, Conn.: Blackbirch Press, 1998), 
pp. 47–48.
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planned and carried out their mass executions. The “excuse for Eichmann” 
stands for all Nazis and, as we shall see below, for all human misdeeds in the 
future. Consider Kristeva again:
Eichmann gave her [Arendt] the opportunity to prove that because the vast majority 
of those who enacted Nazism were not sadistic monsters or inveterate torturers, 
they shared this banal – because it was widespread and because it was often deemed 
innocuous – condition of renouncing personal judgment.18 
Presumably this banal quality also would comfort those troubled by Hutus 
wielding machetes and cutting the throats of Tutsis in Rwanda. After all, it 
was widespread and perhaps considered innocuous inside the peer evaluation 
system. To be fair, Arendt did not consider that the evil that appeared in the 
banal form of Eichmann was other than evil. But, by cloaking evil in the 
terminology of the ʻbanal  ʼshe has done harm: What she wants her readers 
to learn from Eichmann in Jerusalem is “the lesson of the fearsome, word-
and-thought-defying banality of evil” (EJ, pp. 259, 262), but this message 
is buried under her rhetoric. And, its word-and-thought-defying quality is 
simply due to Arendt having been seduced by Eichmannʼs pretense that 
he was ordinary. If Eichmann were in fact a dull, ordinary thinker, and 
all of his justifications of his actions were genuine, then, it might be said 
– if one follows Arendtʼs reasoning so far – that his evil must stem from 
his ordinariness. It would be a simple mistake on Arendtʼs part, but the 
consequences of this simple mistake, this thoughtlessness on Arendtʼs part, 
has had widespread consequences.
On the other hand, we can also separate intellectual agility from moral 
culpability. We can hold Eichmann as morally guilty even if we accept, her 
evidence to the contrary, that he was of dull normal intelligence. For Arendt 
and her legion of scholarly followers, oneʼs evil is banal or trivial if it is the 
product of an ordinary mind. But, why make this equation? A mass murderer, 
even if not an adept thinker, is nonetheless guilty of a monstrous crime which 
in no way is banal or ordinary. Arendt is saying that an ordinary person can 
commit mass murder. This flies in the face of the concept of the normal or 
ordinary. An ordinary person cannot commit mass murder. If one commits 
mass murder, one by definition steps outside the bounds of normality. A 
norm is a standard either of what is considered average or most common or 
it is a standard of what is considered acceptable or good. Normalcy has two 
18
 Kristeva (note 16 above), pp. 148–49.
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meanings: (1) Something is normal in terms of being considered common 
or typical in which case mass murder must be abnormal; (2) Something is 
normal as in the medical description of normal as applied to physical health 
to indicate good health. In the case of the medical use of the term ʻnormal  ʼto 
stand for good, Eichmannʼs actions could not be taken as normal. 
The Influence of Arendt on Holocaust Studies
While it would take us too far astray to trace all of the premises and the 
consequences of Arendtʼs writings, we can focus for a brief moment on a 
well-known case of these consequences, the work of Daniel Goldhagen: In 
a book entitled The “Goldhagen Effect,” several scholars make reference 
to Hannah Arendt. Omer Bartov refers to the notorious work of Stanley 
Milgram. He points out that Milgram “concludes that Arendtʼs conception 
of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than one might dare imagine. 
The ordinary person who shocked the victim [in Milgramʼs experiment] did 
so out of a sense of obligation – a conception of his duties as a subject – and 
not from any peculiarly aggressive tendencies.” Hence, Milgram writes, “the 
most fundamental lesson of our study” is that “ordinary people, simply doing 
their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become 
agents in a terrible destructive process.”19
This concept of the ordinary totally excludes moral thinking from the 
domain of the ordinary or the normal. Anyone can, without hostility, perform 
mass murder. First of all, how in the world can one know that someone who 
on the surface displays no hostility is without hostility? Such a statement 
shows only the most woeful ignorance of psychology. Second, all of 
Milgramʼs subjects are aware they are participating in a study. One cannot 
then say that this is how they would act in real life. Third, if they would 
act so in real life, then how does this mean that they are ordinary? All such 
subjects who would act in such a way to produce pain cannot be taken to be 
normal or ordinary just because of their behavior. Even if it were true that the 
majority of subjects behave so as to condone the inflicting of pain, that does 
not mean that these subjects are normal. It might only signify something 
19
 Omer Bartov, “Reception and Perception: Goldhagenʼs Holocaust and the World,” 
in Geoff Eley (ed.), The “Goldhagen Effect” (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 2000), p. 79; Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1983), p. xii.
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about the abnormality of both this study taking place and the abnormality of 
this period of “civilization.” That subjects who do not consider morality are 
in the majority does not make such thinking ordinary.
How many others have been influenced by Arendtʼs thesis? Browning 
reaches similar conclusions: “If the men of Reserve Police Battalion 
101 could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men 
cannot?”20 Such analyses, devoid of moral scrutiny, find human behavior 
fatalistically inclined to obey authority. While not sanctioning evil-doing, 
such analyses tend to exonerate it and remove the moral sanctions that might 
be instrumental in preventing it from occurring in the first place.
According to Michael Morgan, Richard L. Rubenstein argues that “the 
extermination process [is] the work not of fanatics or maniacs, but rather 
of normal bureaucrats.”21 In Morganʼs view, Emil Fackenheim takes part of 
Arendtʼs thesis and couples it with the totalitarian system such that “horrific 
actions were performed willingly, knowingly and intentionally by ordinary 
people” (p. 186). Where is morality in all this? What makes the performers 
ordinary? That they held down normal jobs? In that case, Hitler was normal 
for he was a head of State.
So long as we have totalitarianism and ordinary people, we have evil. 
Morality, it seems, is in slumberland. But, the crucial part of the thesis, that 
these individuals were “ordinary,” is simply another bastard child of Hannah 
Arendtʼs illicit conclusion, a conclusion that Eichmann was an ordinary, dull 
bureaucrat, a conclusion that has had startling and widespread consequences 
on the literature of evil.
An Analysis of Arendt
What of Arendt, since the others are mere followers of her conclusions? 
Hannah Arendtʼs case is difficult to decipher. On the one hand, a subtle thinker; 
on the other, easily taken in by Nazi performances. In her impressionable 
years, she was under the spell of Heidegger; later, at the trial, she falls under 
Eichmannʼs spell. But, does she? In her confidential correspondence with 
20 Bartov (p. 80) cites Browning; see Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1992), p. 189. 
21
 Michael L. Morgan, Beyond Auschwitz: Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought in 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 104.
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Mary McCarthy, she makes a remarkable revelation:
you were the only reader to understand what otherwise I have never admitted – namely 
that I wrote this book [EJ] in a curious state of euphoria. And that ever since I did it, I 
feel – after twenty years [since the war] – light-hearted about the whole matter. Donʼt 
tell anybody, is it not proof positive that I have no “soul”?22
What does this mean? To me, it does seem odd that the subject of Eichmann 
and his brutal co-murder of millions of people would provoke a state of 
euphoria. And, that such a feeling lingered for twenty years. While it may 
not prove that Hannah Arendt did not have a soul, it does seem to suggest 
that she did not seem to be strongly affected by Eichmannʼs misdeeds.23 
Her not having the appropriate affect might suggest why she thought of 
Eichmann as a banal creature. Since his misdeeds did not occasion any great 
outrage and sadness in her, perhaps he struck her as inconsequential, even 
humorous – in the manner of a Charlie Chaplin portrayal of Hitler – for such 
a reading of Eichmann might produce light-heartedness. It might, in the end, 
be Hannah Arendt sʼ lack of appropriate emotional response to Eichmann 
that caused her to think of him as trivial. This is not necessarily contradictory 
to her being taken in by his act. She may well have taken him to be a small-
time bureaucrat and also have found his actions laughable. Not his actions, 
perhaps, but that he, a small-time bureaucrat had been the one responsible for 
millions of murders. Perhaps, it was this fact that occasioned her euphoria. 
Her euphoria was an effect of the original misreading of Eichmann as an 
inconsequential figure with limited thinking abilities. And, the incongruity 
of such a figure as this being responsible for millions of murders – this – is 
what tickled Hannah Arendtʼs concept of the ludicrous and what continued 
to amuse her twenty years on.
This interpretation of Hannah Arendtʼs confidential comments to 
her friend seems to make more sense than the interpretation ventured by 
22
 Between Friends: The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy 
(note 5 above), p. 168.
23
 If Eichmannʼs deeds did indeed provoke outrage and sadness in Arendt, this is 
not what she writes. From a psychoanalytic perspective, Arendtʼs self-description of 
a light-hearted response could be analyzed as her attempt to cope with her outrage 
and sadness by closing her heart. Nonetheless, history is left with her interpretation 
of Eichmann (whether or not her heart closure is due to a coping mechanism). 
Arendt is not an ordinary survivor; she is a philosopher. She has a responsibility to 
reflect deeply or else she herself is guilty of thoughtlessness. Thoughtlessness in a 
philosopher is not acceptable. 
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Seyla Benhabib. For Benhabib, “The use of the term ʻlight-heartedʼ, 
like the phrase ʻthe banality of evilʼ, is a terminological infelicity; [such 
is the liberty afforded to philosophers] she did not mean that she was 
joyful or carefree about the whole matter; she meant rather that her heart 
was lightened by having shed a burden.”24 This, to my mind, reads too 
much into Arendtʼs text. The text in no way implies that Arendt had a 
burden in the first place and then was glad to have shed it. From Arendtʼs 
text we learn that the feeling of light-heartedness was already present 
during the writing of EJ and remained twenty years later. There is no 
evidence in Arendtʼs text for this psychoanalytic motivation attributed to 
her by Benhabib. On the contrary, Arendtʼs confidential confession to her 
friend is consistent with the sometimes sarcastic tone of the text of EJ, of her 
ridicule of the German of the prosecutor, of the removed tone of the work 
as a whole.
There is further textual evidence for Arendtʼs “comic” interpretation 
of Eichmann. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl writes: “Arendt had realized how 
pathetically comic he [Eichmann] was.”25 Where did this comic reading of 
Eichmann come from? Young Bruehl continues: “Arendt told Jaspers that 
her husband, [Blücher], had often considered the possibility that evil ʻwas a 
superficial phenomenon  ʼand it was this formula that prompted Arendt to give 
her book the subtitle ʻThe Banality of Evil  ʼ” (ibid.). According to Young-
Bruehl, both Hannah Arendtʼs husband and she took confidence in their 
concept from reading a passage from Brecht and “Arendt cited Brecht . . . 
in an interview and then added her own remark, worthy of Eichmann himself, 
that she thought it was important in assessing Hitler and his like to remember 
that ʻno matter what he does and if he killed ten million people, he is still a 
clown  ʼ” (p. 331). And again, Arendt herself in a letter to Mary McCarthy: 
“I am half-way recovered from the Eichmann torture which was not without 
a macabre touch of humour.”26
What of Arendtʼs lack of appropriate affect both during the trial and 
afterwards?
24
 Benhabib, “Arendtʼs Eichmann in Jerusalem,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Hannah Arendt, p. 66.
25
 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1992), p. 330.
26
 Between Friends: The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy, 
p. 119.
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They hanged Eichmann yesterday; my reaction was curious, rather shrugging, [in a 
remark worthy of Eichmann himself], Well, one more life – what difference does it 
make? . . . To execute a man and excite a reaction of indifference is to bring people 
too close to the way the Nazis felt about human life – “One more gone.”
I am glad that they hanged Eichmann. Not that it mattered.27
What do these sayings imply about Hannah Arendtʼs heart? Did she lack an 
appropriate ethical sensibility? Were her thoughtless comments due to the lack 
of an appropriate ethical sensitivity? (her own self-analysis) Or, was her lack 
of an appropriate ethical sensitivity due to her thoughtlessness? According 
to Arendtʼs critique of Kant (leaving aside the question of whether this is a 
correct interpretation of Kant), Kant once observed that “stupidity is caused 
by a wicked heart.” This is not true, she contended, “Absence of thought is 
not stupidity, it can be found in highly intelligent people, and a wicked heart 
is not its cause, it is probably the other way round, that wickedness may be 
caused by the absence of thought.”28 Arendt, taking her cue from Eichmannʼs 
performance in Jerusalem, thought the origin of evil was thoughtlessness. 
That thoughtlessness was the cause of a wicked heart. That if Eichmann had 
been more thoughtful, none of this would ever have happened.
Eichmann, to my mind, was extremely thoughtful. His thoughtfulness 
was responsible for a performance of thoughtlessness flawed only by 
betraying flashes of wicked humor, mock martyrdom, and brilliant self-
serving adaptations of Kantian philosophy. Why Arendt did not notice 
these inconsistencies with his self-portrayal as a simple-minded clod is 
a commentary on her thoughtlessness. And, since Arendt can hardly be 
perceived as unintelligent, the only explanation that makes sense is that 
Arendtʼs thoughtlessness is a result of her having a wicked heart – a fear of 
which she virtually reveals to her correspondent in that moment of revelatory 
candor when she confessed to her light-hearted response to Eichmann.
I am inclined to agree with Mary McCarthyʼs critique of her friend 
Hannah Arendt: “Here I rather agree with Kant . . . that stupidity is caused, 
not by brain failure, but by a wicked heart. Insensitivity . . . It seems to me 
that what you are saying is that Eichmann lacks an inherent human quality: 
the capacity for thought, consciousness – conscience. But then isnʼt he a 
monster simply?”29
27
 Ibid., p. 134–35, 136.
28
 Ibid., pp. xxvii–xxviii. Carol Brightman cites this quotation from Arendt.
29
 Ibid., pp. 296–97.
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And Jaspers, in one of his more illuminating remarks on the issue:
Eichmann has shown still other aspects of himself, among them some personally 
brutal ones. Such a functionary of bureaucratic murder cannot, after all, be without 
personally inhuman qualities, which under the proper circumstances come to 
the surface, even though under “normal” conditions he would not have become a 
criminal.30
Conclusion
What to conclude from all of this? The central point I would like to make 
is that ordinariness is not an excuse for crime. We are all ordinary men and 
women: to put it graphically, the King sits on two thrones. But just as all 
men and women are equal in moral worth; so all men and women are equal 
in moral responsibility. That someone, a group of people or a whole culture, 
commits evil is not forgivable because that someone, that group or that whole 
culture, is made up of ordinary people.
Our morality is in danger of being extinguished. The mass crimes that have 
been perpetrated, whether in Nazi Germany or Rwanda, are not somehow 
excusable because they were all accomplished by ordinary men and women. 
This is the terrible legacy of Arendtʼs flawed concept of the banality of evil. 
Evil is never banal. Evil by definition is to be taken seriously. Evil is not a 
subject of light comedy. Hannah Arendt may have been possessed of a jaded 
sensibility and may have been highly gullible. This combination, of a jaded 
sensibility and a highly impressionable nature, may have resulted in her 
reading of Adolf Eichmann as a small-time bureaucrat who perpetrated large 
crimes the incongruity of which occasioned her satire and aroused her light-
heartedness. But, that is not a sufficient reason why we, her readers and the 
readers of those who comment upon her, should persist in this interpretive 
folly. For it is in the mass merchandising of evil as commonplace that our 
moral senses become vitiated.
However commonplace evil becomes, it must never be thought of as 
ordinary or as banal. If evil is perceived as ordinary or banal, that perception 
is warped. The very thought of evil as ordinary is a monstrous thought. If 
evil is perceived of as perpetrated by ordinary men and women, that is the 
beginning of evil. Evil must always be thought of as perverted, as abnormal, 
as distorted. It cannot become the norm. If evil is the norm, this proves that 
30
 Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, p. 439.
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the times are evil. This is the message of Macbeth. That evil is the norm does 
not prove ordinariness or normality. It proves that morality has disappeared 
or has gone underground.
Goldhagenʼs Germans were not ordinary Germans. They were moral 
monsters. They were ordinary only in the sense of having two ears and two 
eyes. But their hearts were black. If this blackness of heart was shared by a 
majority of Germans, that does not make it ordinary. It means that immorality 
was paramount. The mass slaughters in Rwanda do not mean that they are 
a measure of normality. It is a measure of immorality, however widespread 
and acceptable it has become. Evil is never banal. Hannah Arendt was taken 
in by a performance, not a reality. Eichmann was an evil genius, not a dull 
bureaucrat. Those who commit murders, regardless of what occupations 
they come from, are not ordinary men and women. They are inhuman. They 
may not possess Eichmannʼs wit, his gift at repartée or his thespian abilities, 
and so they may not be evil geniuses. But, they are evil accomplices and 
can never be thought of as ordinary men and women. The banality of evil 
is Hannah Arendtʼs legacy. It needs to be replaced with the monstrosity and 
the inhumanity of evil. We also need to be more critical judges of theatrical 
performances. 
Postscript on a Pseudo-Project
The question arises in the minds of Arendtʼs commentators whether she 
abandoned her original concept of ʻ radical evil  ʼor whether her concept of the 
ʻbanality of evil  ʼis a continuation of her concept of radical evil. If, as is the 
thesis of this article, her concept of the banality of evil is an overlay which 
is a false deduction from Eichmannʼs acting performance in Jerusalem, this 
question is a pseudo-project. Nevertheless, it is worth analyzing for what it 
might disclose.
According to Julia Kristeva, “Arendt posited that radical evil . . . encourages 
[men] to destroy mercilessly a segment of humanity. Arendt believed in the 
existence of an ʻ incalculable evil that men are capable of bringing aboutʼ. . . . 
She associated this radical evil with what Kant called ʻabsolute evil  ʼ . . . 
Arendt maintained, for her part, because its horror, beyond its anti-Semitism 
alone, is in the realm of the unreal.31 
31
 Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt (note 16 above), pp. 143–44.
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It is a real question, to my mind, how the existence of radical evil can 
encourage men to do anything. This seems a flip side to the “banality of 
evil” explanation. Human responsibility is diminished because this time it is 
radical evil that is responsible.
Later, in a response to Scholem, Arendt alters her view about radical evil. 
She says, “It is my opinion now that evil is never ʻradicalʼ, that it is only 
extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. . . . 
It is ʻthought-defyingʼ, as I said, because thought tries to reach some depth, 
to go to the roots, and the moment it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated 
because there is nothing. That is its ʻbanalityʼ. Only the good has depth 
and can be radical.”32 It is highly significant to take note here that Arendt is 
discussing evil itself as banal, not the personality of the evil-doer.
In her Gifford lectures, she states: “In my report of [the Eichmann trial] 
I spoke of ʻthe banality of evilʼ. [Again, it must be noted that she is not 
speaking about Eichmannʼs banal personality, but of the nature of evil itself as 
banal.] Behind that phrase, I held no thesis or doctrine, although I was dimly 
aware of the fact that it went counter to our tradition of thought – literary, 
theological, or philosophic – about the phenomenon of evil.”33 Should we 
take her ʻdim awareness  ʼ as a thoughtful reflection on evil? “What I was 
confronted with was utterly different [from villains who made their motives 
clear such as Iago] and still undeniably factual [she uncritically accepts 
Eichmannʼs presentation of himself as factual]. I was struck by a manifest 
shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the uncontestable evil 
of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives [such was the brilliance 
of the performance]. The deeds were monstrous, but the doer – at least the 
very effective one now on trial [notice the unwitting acknowledgement of the 
prowess of this dull one] – was quite ordinary, common-place, and neither 
demonic nor monstrous. [Did she expect him to foam at the mouth?] There 
was no sign in him of firm ideological convictions or of specific evil motives 
[did she expect him to indict himself?]” (ibid., p. 4).
32
 Julia Kristeva quotes this famous passage (ibid., p. 152). Michael Morgan (note 
21 above, p. 223) finds this quotation in Hannah Arendt, The Jew as Pariah, ed. Ron 
H. Feldman (New York: Grove Press, 1978), pp. 250–51. According to Morgan (p. 223, 
n. 61), this passage was first printed in Encounter, January 1964, pp. 51–66, and this 
excerpt from Arendtʼs famous letter to Gershom Scholem was dated July 24, 1963. 
33
 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 
1971), p. 3.
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In my view, once again, she has taken Eichmannʼs performance as reality. 
If one assumes that at the root of Eichmannʼs motivation is banality, his evil 
will seem of course to be empty. But, why take a performance to be real? The 
Nazi justification of its destruction of Jewry speaks for itself. There does not 
need to be an additional explanation (radical evil) or no explanation (empty 
banality). The entire project of either distinguishing between or conflating 
radical evil and banal evil is indeed a pseudo-project.
For Villa, the “banality of evil” named Eichmannʼs evil, not the evil of the 
perpetrators or the Holocaust in general. This is also in accord with Jaspers  ʼ
view.34 But, this is not how Arendtʼs thesis of the banality of evil has come 
to influence the world. And, if it is meant to apply only to Eichmann and to 
no one else as a unique category of explanation, this would make Eichmann 
out to be a peculiar monster. It is evident, both from the passage in her letter 
to Scholem and from her Gifford lectures quoted above, that her concept of 
the banality of evil is not limited, in her view, to being applied to Eichmann 
alone. Morgan argues that the thrust of Arendtʼs analysis of Eichmann is not 
to limit this analysis to him alone: “The trouble with Eichmann was precisely 
that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted or 
sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal . . . this 
new type of criminal . . . commits his crimes under circumstances that make 
it well-nigh impossible for him to know or feel that he is doing wrong.”35
It is this extension of Arendtʼs thesis that is worrying. For such an extension 
can now be used to justify and mitigate any present and future crimes.
According to Morgan, Young-Bruehl distinguishes between Arendtʼs 
earlier concept of radical evil and her later concept of banal evil by arguing 
that radical evil is “rooted in motives so base as to be beyond human 
comprehension . . . [while in the case of Eichmann] motives become 
superfluous, evil is banal” (p. 20). Morgan comments that this is invalid 
because the earlier concept of Nazi crimes being motiveless only meant 
motiveless in terms of a lust for power or greed (ibid.). While it seems to 
me that Morgan has misunderstood Young-Bruehl as she plainly states that 
the motives are beyond human comprehension not that they are motiveless – 
34
 Villa, Politics, Philosophy and Terror (note 10 above), p. 41; Hannah Arendt/Karl 
Jaspers Correspondence, p. 542.
35
 Morgan, Beyond Auschwitz, p. 53; see also Arendt, Essays in Understanding (note 
14 above), p. 276.
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and, in any case, why should a lack of lust for power or greed imply that there 
are no other motives – the main point is that to take Eichmann sʼ actions as 
motiveless is to accept at face value Eichmannʼs self-defense. For Morgan, 
if Young-Bruehlʼs interpretation is correct, the shift from the language of 
radical evil to banal evil is only terminological. In my view, there is a genuine 
difference in Arendtʼs earlier and later versions of evil, for radical evil means 
for Arendt “extreme and with positive content” and since Eichmannʼs crime 
is evil but thoughtless and hence without positive content, his crime cannot 
be “radical evil” (Morgan, pp. 21–22). Again, the problem is due to taking 
Eichmannʼs self-portrayal as sincere. The entire concept of the banality of 
evil is based on the notion of action without motive, a totally empty action. 
It is a concept that is based on a false premise, in fact, an empty premise. 
If in fact there were such an action which was without motive, it would 
demarcate an evil of momentous proportions. For it is exactly the absence of 
a conscience that marks the presence of an evil personality. If this absence 
of conscience is of momentous proportions, the evil of the personality is 
magnified by the proportions of its absence. From this standpoint, Eichmann 
represents the face of evil itself.
There is no doubt in my mind that the defense of empty action that only 
follows orders is a deceit. It is simply a means of abrogating responsibility. To 
build an entire interpretive category on a deceit gives a posthumous victory 
to Hitler. There is another explanation for the seeming banality or routineness 
with which Nazi murderers butchered their victims. To make what is 
murderous into something routine is simply another way of psychologically 
tolerating the commission of crimes too horrendous to commit. There is no 
doubt that the attempt to create the impression of banality is designed to 
accomplish this end as well. But, it is really two sides of the same coin. 
Banality is a way of making what is unspeakable possible. At the same 
time it is a defense of oneʼs unspeakable acts. If one does not possess an 
evil motive, one is guiltless. One is simply following orders. Banality can 
fulfill both functions. It can make the unspeakable speakable and 
acceptable at the time of its commission and it can exonerate the commission 
of evil in memory. It can also immunize the mind against feeling outrage 
against the commission of evil in the future. To accept banality as a true 
explanation of the reason for the action in the first place is a mistake of 
major magnitude. To say that it was the explanation is a deceit of major 
magnitude.
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All of the discussion of whether Arendt changed from “radical evil” to 
“banal evil” is based on there even being a genuine concept of banal evil 
in the first place. Banal evil is a fabrication twice invented. It was invented 
by perpetrators to enable them to accept their misdeeds. It was invented by 
perpetrators to defend themselves from accusations. There is no need to 
“invent” an explanation for the evil of the Holocaust. The Nazis have already 
supplied it: virulent anti-Semitism. While it may seem to some that the evils 
of the Holocaust are incomprehensible, this only means that to those who 
grasp at the straw of incomprehensibility cannot themselves comprehend 
the virulence of anti-Semitism. It is difficult indeed for good people to 
comprehend evil. This does not mean that evil is incomprehensible. Anti-
Semitism was motive enough for the authors of the Holocaust. These master 
minds were not masterminding a motiveless slaughter. To them what they 
were doing was eminently comprehensible. It would behoove good people 
to understand the motives of evil people and not spin their wheels inventing 
motivations or the lack of motivations for them. There is no need to explain 
the seeming incomprehensibility of the existence of evil. For an explanation 
of the motivation to perform evil deeds, one need only read the writings or 
the recorded sayings of its perpetrators.
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